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the children's retention, stated to be Septem-
ber 2011, there was a wrongful retention. 
Germany, he held, could not be said to have 
been the children's state of habitual resi-
dence at that time. It was concluded on these 
facts that given the children's habitual resi-
dence had been New Zealand up until 2010, 
there was no settled parental purpose to 
change the children's residence, and no under-
lying connection between the children and 
Germany. 
The Judge then proceeded to consider, 
obiter, whether the various defences raised 
by the mother might have succeeded, if 
there had been a wrongful retention. With 
reference to the defences of consent and 
acquiescence, the Judge concluded that the 
father's actions in handing over the pass-
port would not, on the case-law, have 
amounted to 'consent' in relation to the 
son; but, on the other hand, the father 
could be said to have 'acquiesced' to the 
daughter staying in New Zealand. His 
Honour also considered whether the 'child 
objection' defence could potentially have 
been relevant. Here, though, Judge Boshier 
decided that the children's views fell short 
of amounting to an 'objection' to return. 
An "objection", the judge said, carries with 
it a "notion of clarity and force in the way 
it is expressed" (para [63]). 
Finally, the Judge considered, obiter, how 
he would have exercised his residual discre-
tion, upon the assumption that the acquies-
cence defence had been successfully made 
out. His Honour characterised the eight-year-
old girl's views as "material" in the exercise 
of that discretion (at [70]). The girl had a 
preference to stay in New Zealand, he said, 
and she was of a sufficient age for the Court 
to exercise discretion in favour of not return-
ing her. Seemingly, then, the articulation of 
an appropriately mature child's views might 
be weighted more heavily by the Court in the 
exercise of its residual discretion than the 
Convention principles of return. This would 
be entirely consistent with the weighting accorded 
to the child's best interests under the Supreme 
Court plurality's approach to the exercise of 
discretioninSecretaryfarJusticevHJ[2006]NZSC 




National Rugby League Investments Pty 
Ltd v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd 
[2012] FCAFC 59 
This Australian case arises from the latest in a 
series of conflicts between the entertainment 
industry and the electronic equipment indus-
try, and this time the entertainment industry 
has come out on top, at least until the High 
Court of Australia considers the issues. 
The case involved home users requesting 
copies of free to air television programming 
for later viewing, using a service based on 
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cloud computing technology. It required the 
Court to consider the application of the "time-
shifting" exception to copyright infringe-
ment in Australia. The case has potential 
implications for cloud computing services 
more broadly, and for the time-shifting excep-
tion. 
Optus was providing a new subscription 
service, "TV Now", that enabled a sub-
scriber to have free to air television programmes 
recorded and then played back at a time or 
times the subscriber chose, on either a per-
sonal computer or mobile device. The requested 
programmes could be played as many times 
as the subscriber wanted, but would be auto-
matically deleted within 30 days. The TV 
Now system required copying and storing of 
requested programmes at Optus' data centre 
or cloud, leading to allegations of copyright 
infringement. Optus sought clarification from 
the Federal Court. National Rugby League 
Investments (the NRL), the Australian Foot-
ball League (AFL) and Telstra Corporation 
cross-claimed, alleging infringement of their 
copyright in live broadcasts. The NRL and 
AFL owned the copyright in broadcasts of 
their matches, and they had granted Telstra 
(Optus' main competitor), an exclusive licence 
to communicate the free to air broadcast 
matches to the public by means of internet or 
mobile phone. Telstra had reportedly paid 
A$153 million to the AFL for a licence and 
Rugby League were in negotiations as to 
price. 
At first instance the Federal Court held 
that the subscriber and not Optus was the 
maker of the recordings, so that Optus was 
not infringing because it was not making 
copies. He likened the service to the use of a 
VCR or DVR where the user makes copies 
on a home machine. 
The NRL, AFL and Telstra appealed to 
the Full Federal Court. The Full Federal 
Court allowed the appeal. The Court identi-
fied two issues: 
1. when one of the AFL or NRL matches 
was recorded for a subscriber, who 
was the maker of that recording? Optus, 
the subscriber, or both of them jointly? 
2. if Optus was the maker of the record-
ing, did the time-shifting defence in 
sIll ofthe Copyright Act1968 (Cth) 
apply? 
On the first issue of who made the record-
ings, the Full Court differed from the trial 
Judge, and held that either Optus was the 
maker of the recordings, or alternatively (the 
preferred view) that Optus and the sub-
scriber were jointly makers of the record-
ings. The Court said that Optus' role in the 
making of a copy was so pervasive that, even 
though entirely automated, it could not be 
disregarded when the "person" who did the 
act of copying was to be identified. The 
system performed the functions for which it 
was created by Optus. Optus was not merely 
making available its system to another who 
used it to copy a broadcast, rather it cap-
tured, copied, stored and made available for 
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reward, a programme for later viewing by 
another. Optus was therefore infringing by 
making a copy, unless it could come within 
an exception. 
The Full Court then considered whether 
Optus could bring itself within the scope of 
the time-shifting exception in sIll. The 
trial Judge did not have to consider sIll 
because he had found that Optus did not 
make the copies. 
Section 111 of the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) provides: 
Recording broadcasts for replaying at more 
convenient time 
(1) This section applies if a person 
makes a cinematograph film or sound 
recording of a broadcast solely for 
private and domestic use by watch-
ing or listening to the material broad-
cast at a time more convenient than 
the time when the broadcast is made. 
(2) The making of the film or record-
ing does not infringe copyright in 
the broadcast or in any work or 
other subject-matter included in 
the broadcast. 
The Court said that there was an issue as to 
whether sIll applied only to the maker of 
the film or sound recording or whether it 
could extend to a person making a copy not 
for his own private of domestic use but for 
the private and domestic use of someone 
else. The Court reviewed the legislative his-
tory of s 111, and concluded that: 
There is nothing in the language, or the 
provenance, of sIll to suggest that it 
was intended to cover commercial copy-
ing on behalf of individuals. Moreover, 
the natural meaning of the section is that 
the person who makes the copy is the 
person whose purpose is to use it as pre-
scribed by s 111(1). Optus may well be 
said to have copied programmes so that 
others can use the recorded programme 
for the purpose envisaged by sIll. Optus, 
though, makes no use itself of the copies 
as it frankly concedes. It merely stores 
them for 30 days. And its purpose in 
providing its service - and, hence in 
making copies of programmes for sub-
scribers - is to derive such market advan-
tagein the digitallV industry as its commercial 
exploitation can provide. Optus cannot 
invoke the sIll exception. 
The Court concluded that if Optus alone 
was the maker of the copies, then it had 
infringed the copyright interests of the AFL, 
the NRL partners and Telstra. If both Optus 
and the subscriber were the makers of the 
copies, then but for the operation of sIll, 
they each would be jointly and severally 
liable for doing the acts comprised in the 
copyright of the respective owners, but the 
subscriber could rely on s 111. Optus could 
not rely on s 111. 
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The Court emphasised that this decision 
was limited to the particular service provider-
subscriber relationship in the TV Now ser-
vice and to the particular technology used. 
Different relationships and different tech-
nologies might well yield different results. 
The Court also said that if s 111 was to be 
modified to include the technology at issue 
in the case, it required a legislative rather 
than a judicial choice. 
This decision has been welcomed by sport-
ing organisations including the NRL and 
AFL, who were concerned about the value of 
broadcasting rights for major events. Optus 
has now suspended its TV Now service, and 
has applied for leave to appeal to the High 
Court, so the case is not necessarily resolved. 
There is also lobbying taking place on both 
sides in relation to possible legislative amend-
ment, and the matter is likely to be consid-
ered as part of the current Australian Law 
Reform Commission Review of the Copy-
right Act. 
The precise facts of this case are unlikely 
to be replicated in New Zealand, where there 
is much more limited free to air sports broad-
casting than in Australia. Most major sport 
is televised by Sky Tv, which also offers its 
own My Sky DVR service. However, the 
issues may arise in other contexts, and the 
implications of the Full Federal Court's rea-
soning for New Zealand copyright law are 
interesting. Section 84 of the New Zealand 
Copyright Act 1994 contains a time shifting 
exception for copying of communication works, 
inserted in 2008. It provides that: 
Section 84 would protect the subscriber 
to a service like TV Now from action for 
infringement. However, on the reasoning 
of the Full Federal Court, it would not 
protect a service provider like Optus, if 
the service provider was found to have 
copied in terms of ss 16 and 30, because 
the service provider would not be record-
ing solely for personal use. If a New Zealand 
court applied the Full Federal Court rea-
soning, a service like TV Now based on 
cloud computing would be found to infringe 
in New Zealand also, so that this form of 




875 Frankton Road Ltd v Brookes and 
Harrison 
[2012] NZHC 78 
This case involved an appearance to pro-
test jurisdiction under r 5.49 of the High 
Court Rules. The defendants had agreed to 
buy a property in Queenstown. They first 
became interested in the property because 
the company selling the property had come 
to London to advertise to interested buy-
ers. The necessary financing arrangements 
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were made over the phone with a person 
based in New Zealand, and the final 
contract was signed by the parent of one 
of the defendants in New Zealand. The 
proper law was New Zealand law. The 
purchase was never settled for a range of 
reasons relating to a change in purpose of 
the property (from short stay accommo-
dation to long term rental accommodation) 
and the related loss of a potential GST 
refund. The High Court decided after a full 
survey of the law on forum conveniens that 
England was the more appropriate forum. 
Of particular interest is the finding that (1) 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(UK) was a complex and relevant law 
better dealt with in an English court, 
despite the fact that New Zealand was the 
proper law of the contract and (2) the 
existence of other proceedings against English 
defendants in the same position as the 
defendants were irrelevant to the deter-
mination of the appropriate forum in this 
litigation. 
Kuehne + Nagel International AG 
v Commerce Commission 
[2012] NZCA 221 
This was an appeal from the decision in Com-
merce Commission v Deutsche Bahn CIV-
2010-404-005479. The appeal was dismissed. 
The Commerce Commission claimed that the 
defendants had engaged in anti-competitive 
conduct overseas in relation to seven cartel 
agreements in breach of ss 27 and 90 of the 
Commerce Act 1986 (NZ). Proceedings were 
served outside New Zealand without leave. 
Jurisdiction was protested under r 5.49 ofthe 
High Court Rules, so r 6.29(1) applied. The 
requirement that the Commission establish it 
had a good arguable case that the claim fell 
wholly within one or more of the paragraphs 
of r 6.27 was the primary matter in dispute. It 
does not require that the plaintiff establish a 
prima facie case, but a sufficiently plausible 
foundation that the claim falls under one of 
the headings. The Commission relied on 
r 6.27 (2)(j) which provides for service outside 
New Zealand without leave where any act or 
omission to which the claim relates was done 
or occurred in NZ, or any loss or damage to 
which the claim relates was sustained in NZ. 
The immediate difficulty in this case was 
that all the contracts were entered into out-
side New Zealand. There was therefore a ques-
tion whether the defendants could be 
considered to be "carrying on business in 
New Zealand". The defendant had within its 
group of companies an entity operating in 
New Zealand. The defendant itself did not 
carry on business in New Zealand. However 
it was noted that international defendants do 
use their New Zealand subsidiaries as instru-
ments to give effect to agreements settled over-
seas but designed to affect, inter alia, 
New Zealand markets. There was in this case 
the necessary linkage for potential liability of 
the defendant with its subsidiary through s 90. 
Section 27(2) did apply to the giving effect to 
the cartel arrangements. 
South Pacific Industrial Ltd v United 
Telecoms Ltd 
[2012] NZHC 688 
This was the first of a series of five judgments 
ofHeathJ (between 13 Apriland9 May2012) 
in relation to a New Zealand company's appli-
cation for an order to restrain the defendant, 
an Indian company that was the part of a 
multi-national group of companies, from 
transporting its New Zealand machinery 
assets to India, and remitting the proceeds of 
the sale of other assets to India. The applica-
tion was opposed on the basis that the plain-
tiff had agreed to arbitration. 
SPI contracted with UTL to dismantle the 
parts at the Marsden B power station, which 
UTL had bought for the express purpose of 
dismantling and sending back to India. The 
contract had allowed for the removal of some 
asbestos, but only a few days into the disman-
tling it became clear that there was asbestos 
present in much greater quantities than had 
been anticipated. This meant that there was a 
greater amount of work for SPI to complete 
than had been anticipated. The dispute was 
about the extra amount of compensation that 
should be given for that work. The power 
station had been dismantled and was ready 
for shipping to India. Some scrap had been 
sold and the profits remitted to an account in 
India. 
The plaintiff's application was intended to 
protect the plaintiff's ability to enforce any 
arbitral award it might obtain. It was held 
that courts may make freezing orders even if 
the dispute is before arbitration. The factors 
that the Court looked to in deciding the case 
were whether SPI had a good arguable case on 
its substantive claim, whether there were assets 
of UTL within the jurisdiction to which any 
orders could apply and whether there was a 
risk for the plaintiff from dissipation of the 
defendant's assets. 
The initial decision was to grant an interim 
injunction pending further argument on the 
question of freezing orders. Subsequently the 
facts were discovered to be different from those 
understood at the first hearing and the formal 
order was that the defendant should make a 
security payment into a trust account pending 
resolution of the dispute between the parties. 
Substantive proceedings were stayed pending 
arbitration by consent of the parties. The judg-
ment referred extensively to Shaw v Narain 
[1992] 2 NZLR544 (CA) and provides a good 
review of the cases relating to freezing orders. 
It is interesting to note that in concluding its 
judgment the Court referred for support of its 
approach to the inherent jurisdiction of the 
Court as provided in s 16 of the Judicature Act 
1908. The case highlights the difficulties of 
finding the right balance between protecting 
the interests ofthe plaintiff as a possible judg-
ment creditor and the property rights pre-
judgment of a defendant. 0 
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